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WHEN “LEGISLATURE” MAY MEAN MORE THAN “LEGISLATURE:”
INITIATED ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM
AND THE GHOST OF BUSH V. GORE
RICHARD L. HASEN*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario, which, as of the time of this draft, may
not be likely but is not at all far-fetched: Hillary Clinton is locked in a close race
with Rudolph Giuliani to become the 44th president of the United States.
California Republicans raise funds to qualify a ballot measure to appear on the
November 2008 ballot which would change the allocation of California’s 55
Electoral College votes used to determine the next president. Rather than using a
statewide winner-take-all system which appoints all of the state’s 55 electors to
the winner of the statewide popular vote, the initiative would change the method
to appoint 2 of the electors based on a statewide popular vote, and the remaining
electors based on the results of the popular vote for president in each state
congressional district.1 The measure is widely expected to help Republicans
capture as many as 20 Electoral College votes and could well make the difference
in the election nationally. Democrats file suit a pre-election suit to keep the
measure off the ballot arguing, among other things, that the measure violates
Article II of the United States Constitution, which they say allows only the state
legislature, and not the people legislating through the initiative process, to pick
the rules for choosing presidential electors2. The California Supreme Court,
citing precedent allowing it to decline pre-election review of substantive
constitutional claims,3 denies review. The measure passes at the same time
California voters vote for president, and the fate of the presidency stands in the
balance: without a portion of California’s votes, Clinton loses and Giuliani cannot
become president. With 20 of California’s electoral votes, Giuliani becomes
president.
*

William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks
to Mark Scarberry and Rick Pildes for useful comments and suggestions, Lisa Schultz for library
assistance, and Alex Chen and John Khosravi for research assistance.
1
See infra Part I.A.
2
See U.S. CONST. Art. II § 1 (“Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress…”).
3
Independent Energy Producers v. McPherson, 136 P.3d 178, 184 (Cal. 2006). See infra Part
III.A.
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The California Supreme Court rules on the legality of the initiative and the
losing party files a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,
which for the second time in three elections, must decide a case that will
determine the outcome of the presidential election.4 The identity of the 44th
president turns on a single legal question: Does the reference to “Legislature” in
Article II refer only to the state legislature itself, or can it include the legislative
power of the people to govern by initiative, recognized in a state constitution?
The results may depend upon whether the conservatives on the Court will stick
with a strict textual reading of the term “Legislature” set forth in a concurring
opinion in Bush v. Gore5 to the detriment of Giuliani and upon whether the
liberals on the Court will abandon their skepticism of the textualist reading of
“Legislature” expressed in their Bush v. Gore dissents,6 to the detriment of
Clinton. The irony meter is off the charts.
This Article examines the question of the constitutionality of changes to
the Electoral College accomplished through the initiative process; it does not
discuss the merits of either the Electoral College or reforms that have been
proposed to change it (whether through the initiative process or otherwise). Part I
gives the brief history of attempts to use the state initiative process to change the
rules for choosing presidential electors, beginning with Colorado’s Amendment
36, which failed to pass in the 2004 election, to the current California measure,
whose fate is unclear as of this writing. It also explains that even if the California
measure fails to qualify or pass, this issue could well arise in a future election
because of general dissatisfaction among segments of the population with the
Electoral College system for choosing the President. Part II turns to the
constitutional question whether initiated changes to rules for choosing
presidential electors violate Article II. It offers an analysis of the question based
upon the text of Article II, relevant Supreme Court caselaw involving Article II,
as well as Articles I and V, and the possible purposes behind Article II’s use of
the term “Legislature.” It concludes that the issue of the constitutionality of
initiated Electoral College reform is a difficult one to resolve about which
reasonable jurists will differ, and because of that difficulty resolution by the
Supreme Court could appear to be colored by the political considerations of who
could lose or win by resolution of the question raising the specter of another Bush
v. Gore. Part III concludes with two strategies that can help avoid the Article II
question from becoming the next Bush v. Gore. First, courts should be more
willing to engage in pre-election review of such measures, so that these issues can
4

The first such case, of course, was Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
See id. at 112-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring).
6
See id. at 123-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 130-33 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 141-43
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 147-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5
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be resolved before, rather than after, an election. Second, Congress should
consider amending the Constitution with an election administration amendment
that would impose a two-year waiting period before any state’s changes to
Electoral College rules may go into effect. An amendment changing the Electoral
College itself would be difficult to pass through Congress and the states. But my
proposal is a neutral amendment ex ante that could decouple the consideration of
the merits of Electoral College reform from the short term political advantages
that could come from such a change.

I.
THE BRIEF HISTORY OF INITIATED ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM
A.

2004: Colorado’s Amendment 36

The election of the United States president is hardly a straightforward affair.
Major party presidential candidates are chosen at presidential conventions, whose
delegates are chosen through primaries or caucuses conducted in each state.7
Each state has its own rules on who may vote in party primaries, and these rules
are subject to constitutional objections by the political parties.8 Independent
candidates may attempt to bypass the nomination process and qualify state-bystate to appear on the general election ballot for president. Each state sets its own
rules for independent candidacies, some of which have been struck down as too
onerous.9
In the general election, presidential candidates compete for presidential
electors state-by-state. Each state is entitled to a number of electoral votes equal
to the number of its members of Congress in the House of Representatives (which
in turn is determined by the state’s population), plus two more electors for each of
the state’s two U.S. Senators.10 All but two states provide that the plurality
winner of a popular vote among eligible voters in each state is entitled to all of
that state’s electoral votes. Two states, Maine and Nebraska, currently provide
that two of the state’s Electoral College votes go to the statewide plurality winner,
with the remainder being allocated by the plurality winner of each congressional
district.11 The states send their certified Electoral College votes to Congress,
7

For an overview of the presidential primary process and the development of the direct primary
for choosing nominees of the major political parties, see ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT
PRIMARY: PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH (2003).
8
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
9
E.g. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
10
U.S. CONST. Art. II. For an more detailed overview of the procedure for choosing a president,
see GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA 1-30 (2004).
11
ROBERT BENNETT, TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 43 (2006).
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which counts and certifies the votes.12 A candidate obtaining a majority of
Electoral College votes becomes president.13 In the event there is no majority
winner, the Constitution provides a convoluted procedure for the House of
Representatives to pick the President and for the Senate to choose the vice
president.14
Controversy over the merits of the Electoral College system for choosing the
U.S. president are not new,15 and over time there have been thousands of
proposals for changing or even abolishing the Electoral College system.16 The
most straightforward way to change to the Electoral College system is through a
constitutional amendment or through an Article V constitutional convention.17
But both of these routes for amending the Constitution are exceedingly difficult:
constitutional amendments require approval of a two-thirds vote of Congress and
an affirmative vote of three-quarters of the state legislatures.18 Article V
conventions are even harder, requiring two-thirds of the state legislatures to call
the Convention and approval of the Convention’s proposed amendments by threequarters of the state legislatures or three-quarters of state conventions as Congress
determines.19 And to the extent that Electoral College reform could hurt some
states, those states would have a strong incentive to block and relative ease in
blocking such reforms either in Congress or in state legislatures.
For this reason, some Electoral College reformers recently have preferred to
move state-by-state. Some of these proposed reforms, as we shall see, seek to
make changes only within one state. Other proposed reforms seek to impose a
national change to the Electoral College system through an agreement among the
12

Id. at 1.
U.S. CONST. Amend XII.
14
Id. Professor Levinson calls the provisions in the Twelfth Amendment for resolving elections
in which no candidate has a majority of Electoral College votes “a national constitutional crisis
just waiting to happen.” SANFORD LEVINSON: OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 91 (2006).
The merits of these provisions are beyond the scope of this Article.
15
For a recent and thoughtful debate on the merits of the Electoral College among Professors
Sanford Levinson, John McGinnis, and Daniel Lowenstein, see PENNumbra, Should We
Dispense with the Electoral College?, http://pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=8.
16
Joy McAffee, Should the College Electors Finally Graduate? The Electoral College: An
American Compromise from Its Inception to Election 2000, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 643, 645 n.8
(2002).
17
See LEVINSON, supra note 14, ch. 6 (chapter entitled “The Impermeable Article V”).
18
U.S. CONST. Art. V. It should be noted, however, that despite political difficulties the
Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the direct election of Senators rather than their selection
through state legislatures, was accomplished by amendment. LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 161-62
minimizes the significance of the Seventeenth Amendment’s passage to passage of future
Amendments. He says that its history does not “demonstrate that the Constitution … is not an
iron cage.”
19
U.S. CONST. Art. V
13
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states as to the allocation of Electoral College votes.20 The most prominent of the
current crop of proposals is the National Popular Vote plan, which would have
states agree to allocate all of their electors to whomever was declared the winner
of the popular vote for president in the entire United States. The agreement
would become effective only when approved by states with a majority of the
electors in the Electoral College.21
So far as I can tell, all of the changes to the means for allocating Electoral
College votes have been accomplished through actions of state legislatures.22
Indeed, before 2004, it appears that no state ever even considered the question of
Electoral College reform through a voter initiative.23 In 2004, however, Colorado
voters considered a voter initiative, “Amendment 36,” which would have changed
the Colorado Constitution to provide for allocation of the state’s Electoral Votes
proportionally according to the results of the popular vote for president in the
state.24 Thus, a presidential candidate receiving 70% of the state’s popular votes
20

There remains a serious question about whether such end runs around the amendment process
would run afoul of the Constitution’s “Compact Clause” in Article I, section 10. For competing
analyses, see Derek T. Miller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Compact, 6
ELECTION L.J. 372 (2007) and Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election of the President: Using or
Abusing the Electoral College (unpublished draft dated Nov. 15, 2007, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030385). That question too is beyond the
scope of this Article.
21
For the detailed plan of the organization as well as legal analysis, see JOHN R. KOZA et al.,
EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL
POPULAR VOTE (2006). The text is also available on the Internet at www.every-vote-equal.com,
with
additional
information
about
the
National
Popular
Vote
group
at
www.natonalpopularvote.com.
22
Maine adopted its change to partial allocation by congressional district in 1969. KOZA, supra
note 21, at 54. Its current rule is codified at 21-A ME. REV. ST. ANN. § 802. Nebraska enacted its
similar change in 1992. See KOZA, supra note 21, at 54. It is currently codified at NEB. ST. ANN.
§32-710.
23
A search of M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC (2003) reveals no
initiative titles on the subject of Electoral College reform. In contrast to initiatives directly
changing the means for choosing electors, there have been initiatives proposed that would have
otherwise changed the nature of who may vote for president or how votes are cast or counted. For
example, Alaska voters considered, and rejected, a measure to use instant runoff voting in a
number of elections, including for the president. See Alaska Ballot Measure 1, August 2002,
Section 4, available at: http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/petitions/99prvt.htm; Rachel
D’Oro, Preferential Voting Suffers Sound Defeat, ALASKA DAILY NEWS, Aug. 28, 2002, available
at: http://www.adn.com/front/story/1678169p-1794934c.html. But so far as I can tell these
measures have never been challenged on Article II grounds.
24
The text of the initiative, Amendment 36, Selection of Presidential Electors, is available at
http://www.lawanddemocracy.org/pdffiles/COamend36.pdf [hereafter “Amendment 36 Text”].)
For additional background on the measure and the litigation, see David S. Wagner, The Forgotten
Avenue of Reform: The Role of States in Electoral College Reform and the Use of Ballot
Initiatives to Effect that Change, 25 REV. LITIG. 575 (2006).
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for president would receive roughly 70% of Colorado’s electoral votes, and the
candidate receiving 30% of the popular votes would receive about 30% of the
electoral votes.25
Amendment 36 was controversial when it was proposed, and it was subject to
legal challenge while voters considered it. Among the arguments raised against it
was that under Article II of the Constitution only a state legislature may make
changes in the rules for allocating presidential electors.26 Opponents also argued
that the measure, even if it passed, could not go into effect for the 2004 election.27
A federal district court refused to rule on the merits of the legal arguments before
the election,28 and the issue was mooted when voters rejected Amendment 36 by a
vote of about 65% against the measure to 35% in favor.29
B.

2008: The California Electoral College Measure

The question of initiated Electoral College reform has again emerged in the
2008 election, this time in California.30 A prominent California Republican
25

The amendment provided detailed rounding rules to proportionally allocate Colorado’s 9
electoral votes. See Amendment 36 Text, supra note 24.
26
See Complaint, Napolitano v. Davidson, No. 04-RB-2114, (D. Colo), para. 4i available at:
(“Plaintiff
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/amend36complaint.pdf
maintains that Article II, § 1 of the United States Constitution requires that the Colorado
Legislature direct the manner of choosing presidential electors, that the Proposal prevents the
Colorado Legislature from doing so in the 2004 election, and, accordingly, that the Proposal is
unconstitutional in this regard.”).
27
See Wagner, supra note 24, at 600.
28
See Kirk Johnson, Judge Allows Referendum on Dividing Colorado Electoral College Vote,
Oct. 26, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/26/politics/campaign/27electcnd.html?hp&ex=1098849600&en
=ac6e91fd999e7728&ei=5094&partner=homepage. Napolitano, who brought suit without a
lawyer, did not appeal. Rick Hasen, Judge Dismisses Federal Lawsuit Challenging Colorado’s
Amendment
36,
Election
Law
Blog,
Oct.
26,
2004,
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/002205.html. It does not appear that the district court judge
issued a written ruling in dismissing Napolitano’s claim, but instead incorporated his oral findings
of fact and conclusions of law into the final judgment. [I have ordered a transcript of these oral
statements and subsequent versions of this article will incorporate what I have found in the
transcript.]
29
See State of Colorado, Official Publication of the Abstract of Votes Cast 2003-2004, at 137-38,
http://www.elections.colorado.gov/WWW/default/Prior%20Years%20Election%20Information/2
004/Abstract%202003%202004%20082305%20Late%20PM-5.pdf.
30
Earlier in the year, Democrats in the North Carolina Legislature attempted to make a similar
change in their state through the legislative process, only to be asked to abandon the effort by the
chairman of the National Democratic Committee. James Romoser, N.C., California in an
Electoral Juggle; Bids to Alter System May Favor Either Party, WINSTON-SALEM J., Aug. 17
2007, 2007 WLNR 15993541.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1065421

INITIATED ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM

7

election lawyer, Tom Hiltachk, began circulating a ballot measure31 which would
change California’s system for allocating the state’s 55 electoral votes from a
winner-take-all system to a districting system, along the lines of the Maine and
Nebraska systems.32 The measure was immediately attacked by some liberals as a
Republican power grab; Professor (and Maryland state senator) Jamin Raskin
wrote that the “real purpose [of the measure] is to break up the state’s 55 electors,
which typically go to the Democrats in a bloc as inevitably as Texas, Georgia, and
Oklahoma give their 56 combined electors to the Republicans. Following the
proposed division of California’s well-gerrymandered blue and red congressional
districts, it is likely that the 2008 GOP nominee under this plan would carry away
about 20 electors. In one fell swoop, this would ruin the Democrats’ chances for
winning the presidency.”33
Hiltachk abandoned the effort to qualify the measure after some controversy
over the source for funding the qualification of the measure for the ballot,34 but it
was picked up by other Republican consultants and the effort is apparently being
funded by supporters of presidential candidate Rudolph Giuliani and other
prominent Republicans, including the state’s Republican Party.35 Democrats have
vowed to challenge the measure, including on grounds that it violates Article II of
the Constitution.36 It is unclear at this time whether the measure will qualify for
the ballot, and if it qualifies for the ballot whether it would appear on the June
2008 primary ballot or the November 2008 general election ballot.37 Nor is it
clear whether, if the measure qualifies for the ballot, the California Supreme

31

The full text of the proposed ballot measure, No. 07-0032, is available at:
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/initiatives/2007-07-17_07-0032_Initiative.pdf
32
See Hendrik Hertzberg, Votescam, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 6, 2007,
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2007/08/06/070806taco_talk_hertzberg.
33
Jamin Raskin, Deformed Reform: The Cure for the Electoral College is Worse than What Ails
Us, SLATE, Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2172700/.
34
Carla Marinucci, Democrats Wants Feds to Investigate Electoral College Ballot Effort, S.F.
CHRONICLE,
Oct.
2,
2007,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/10/02/MND2SHTNQ.DTL&tsp=1.
35
See id.; Kevin Yamamura, Issa Boosts Electoral Measure, SAC. BEE, Nov. 1, 2007,
http://www.sacbee.com/111/story/465074.html.
36
Kevin Yamamura, Legal Challenge on Electoral Change, SAC. BEE, Nov. 2, 2007,
http://www.sacbee.com/111/story/467322.html. If the measure appears on the November ballot
and passes, it would be vulnerable to challenge on grounds that it cannot go into effect until the
2012 presidential election because initiative measures, unless they otherwise provide, go into
effect the day after the election. CAL. CONST. Art. 2, § 10a (“An initiative statute or referendum
approved by a majority of votes thereon takes effect the day after the election unless the measure
provides otherwise.”). This question is beyond the scope of this Article.
37
See Yamamura, supra note 36 (“The group is aiming for the June ballot but would also consider
the November 2008 election if it cannot meet signature requirements for the earlier election.”).
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Court will engage in pre-election review of the measure, a point addressed in Part
III.A of this Article.
C.

The Future of Initiated Electoral College Reform

Even if the California measure fails to qualify for the ballot or if it qualifies
for the ballot and it goes down to defeat, Electoral College reformers are likely to
continue to look to the initiative process as a potential avenue for Electoral
College reform. Indeed, proponents of the National Popular Vote plan devote
considerable space in their book to argue for the constitutionality of enacting their
proposal via the statewide initiative process38 (though it appears that all of the
action on the plan thus far has taken place in state legislative chambers and not
through the initiative process39). Given the difficulties with formally amending
the U.S. Constitution, it is not at all surprising that proponents of reform have
looked in the direction of initiatives, which bypasses both Congress and state
legislatures. If popular dissatisfaction40 and academic dissatisfaction41 with the
Electoral College continues, expect to see more Electoral College initiatives in the
future, at least until the Supreme Court rules on the Article II question.

II.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INITIATED ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM
A.

Introduction

38

KOZA et al., supra note 21, at 291-337.
So far, Maryland is the only state to pass the National Popular Vote plan through legislative
enactment. MD CODE, ELECTION LAW § 8-5A-01. State legislatures in California and Hawaii
passed the measure, but the governor of each state vetoed the plan. Brian Charlton, House
Democrats Choose Not to Override Electoral College Veto, AP, May 4, 2007; 5/4/07 AP Alert HI 05:02:53. Steve Lawrence, Senate OKs Giving State’s Electoral College Votes to Popular Vote
Winner, AP, May 15, 2007, 5/15/07 AP Alert - CA 00:22:35. It is beyond the scope of this
Article whether Article II of the United States Constitution obviates the need for state legislatures
to obtain the signature of the government to make Electoral College change effective.
40
“Polls since the 1970s consistently show approximately 60 percent of Americans agree” that the
Electoral College should be abolished. LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT UNION: 23
PROPOSALS TO REVITALIZE OUR CONSTITUTION AND MAKE AMERICA A FAIRER COUNTRY 141
(2007).
41
Among the recent academic books criticizing the current electoral college are BENNETT, supra
note 11; LEVINSON, supra note 14; EDWARDS, supra note 10. See also SABATO, supra note 40, at
134-53 (arguing that we “mend,” not “end” the Electoral College).
39
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The primary legal question over initiated Electoral College reform is easily
stated: Article II of the Constitution provides: “Each state shall appoint, in such
manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the
whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled
in the Congress…”42 Does the vesting of power in each state’s “Legislature” to
set the manner of choosing presidential electors mean that only the state
legislature can choose such rules, or does the term refer instead to the state’s
entire “legislative process,” including the initiative process in states that give the
people the power to legislate via direct initiative? If it means the former, which I
will refer to as the “Legislature means Legislature” theory of Article II,43 initiated
Electoral College reform is unconstitutional. If it means the latter, which I will
refer to as the “Legislature as legislative process” theory of Article II, then there
is no Article II objection to initiated Electoral College reform.
In a recent comment to New York Times columnist Bob Herbert, noted
constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe stated that the proposed California
Electoral College initiative “clearly violates Article II of the Constitution, which
very explicitly requires that the electors for president be selected ‘in such manner
as the Legislature’ of the state directs.”44 “In Mr. Tribe’s view, the ‘one and only
way’ for California to change the manner in which its electoral votes are
apportioned is through an act of the State Legislature.”45 Professor Tribe’s
certitude is an eerie echo of Justice Stevens’ dissent in the 2000 Bush v. Gore
case, in which the Justice stated the opposite position, finding it “perfectly clear”
that the term “Legislature” used in Article II should be interpreted as parallel to

42

U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).
See C. Bryan Wilson, What’s a Federalist to Do? The Impending Clash Between Textualism
and Federalism in State Congressional Redistricting Suits Under Article I, Section 4, 53 DUKE
L.J. 1367, 1383 (2004) (discussing, in terms of Article I, Section 4, “The Literal Meaning:
‘Legislature’
Means
‘Legislature’
and
No
Other
State
Entity.”).
The
“Legislature means Legislature” concept sometimes goes under the name “Independent State
Legislature” theory. See Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State
Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 731, 732 (2001). The “Independent” portion of the
term refers to the right of the state legislature to set rules for choosing electors unencumbered by
other branches of state government or other state-based constraints, such as state constitutions. In
the context of the dispute over initiated Electoral College reform, I believe the term “Legislature
means Legislature” theory is more intuitive than the term “Independent State Legislature.”
44
Bob Herbert, In 2008, Bush v. Gore Redux?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/22/opinion/22herbert.html.
45
Id.
43
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its use in Article I, section 4—which Justice Stevens read as consistent with the
“Legislature as legislative process” theory.46
As I will argue, the answer to the constitutional question is far from clear in
either direction. There is no caselaw directly on point, and the remaining caselaw
can be used to support either position. Even if one moves beyond precedent to
the possible purposes behind Article II—from democratization/legislative
filtration, to anti-partisan manipulation, to preserving the national interest or
promoting federalism—the issue is not easily resolved. As Professor Pildes told
Bob Herbert, “This is not an open-and-shut case.”47
B.

The Textualist Argument and Original Understanding

The strongest argument in favor of the “Legislature means Legislature” theory
is a purely textual one with great intuitive appeal. Article II provides that each
state “Legislature” gets to “direct” the “manner” for choosing presidential
electors. There seems little question that the term “Legislature,” used at the time
of the ratification of the Constitution (and today), meant (and means) the body of
representatives that passes laws in each state.48 Applying this definition, the
people of a state, acting through the initiative process, may not “direct” the
“manner” of choosing presidential electors because the “people” are not the
“Legislature.”49
46

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 124 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is perfectly clear that the
meaning of the words ‘Manner’ and ‘Legislature’ as used in Article II, § 1, parallels the usage in
Article I, § 4, rather than the language in Article V. [Citations.] Article I, § 4, and Article II, § 1,
both call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking capacity whereas Article V simply calls n the
legislative body to deliberate upon a binary decision.”).
47
Herbert, supra note 44. Professor Amar has taken a middle position: “There is a significant
chance the current Court would continue to hold that Article II’s specific reference to state
‘legislatures’ insulates those legislatures from judicial oversight that otherwise would be provided
for under state law….If that it so, it is at least arguable that the same could be said about popular
initiatives that override and thus displace the statutes the California legislature has already passed
in this area: These initiatives, too, might be seen by the Court as impermissibly interfering with
the legislature’s complete discretion in this area.” Vikram David Amar, The So-Call Presidential
Election Reform Act: A Clear Abuse of California’s Initiative Process, FINDLAW, Aug. 17, 2007,
available at: http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/amar/20070817.html.
48
As the Supreme Court explained in Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920), discussing the
term in the context of the Constitution’s Article V: “A Legislature was [at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution] the representative body which made the laws of the people.” The
Supreme Court approved this language in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365-66, an Article I,
section 4 case. See also id. (“Wherever the term ‘legislature’ is used in the Constitution, it is
necessary to consider the nature of the particular action in view.”).
49
Professor Epstein appears to view this textualist interpretation of Article II as self-evident:
“Article II, Section I, Clause 2 reads like a strict liability provision. The Florida legislature directs
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The drafting history of Article II is scant,50 though we do know that the
drafters put the power to choose the rules for presidential electors in the hands of
the state Legislatures rather than mandating—as in the case of choosing members
of the House of Representatives51—the popular election of the president.52 The
initiative process did not exist in the states at the time of the ratification of the
United States Constitution at the end of the 18th century,53 and unsurprisingly I
am aware of nothing in Article II’s drafting history suggesting the drafters or
ratifiers considered the question of the propriety of initiated Electoral College
reform.
To some, the textualist argument may be enough to embrace the “Legislature
means Legislature” theory and to reject initiated Electoral College reform as a
violation of Article II. It appears that this instinct is behind Professor Tribe’s
comment that the Constitution “very explicitly” leaves the question in the hands
of the Legislature.54
But textualist arguments do not always persuade even textualists, especially in
the face of caselaw and practice that has already adding nuance to the meaning, or
even changed the plain meaning, of words.55 Indeed, as we shall see, despite the
apparent clarity of the meaning of the term “Legislature,” in some constitutional
contexts the Supreme Court has read the term “Legislature” more broadly to
include the “legislative process” of the state. These precedents could weigh
heavily on Supreme Court Justices who might have decided the issue differently

the manner in which presidential electors are appointed, and all other actors within the Florida
system have to stay within the confines of that directive.” Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner
as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”; The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE:
BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT 13, 20 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds. 2001).
50
The most extensive discussion of Article II’s drafting history that I have found appears in
Smith, supra note 43, at 743-64. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v.
Gore, in THE VOTE, supra note 49, at 99, 103 (“There is no relevant legislative history explaining
why the famers of the Constitution made [the departure from the ‘usual principle of federal
constitutional law, which allows the people of each state to determine for themselves how to
allocate power among state governing institutions.’]”).
51
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”).
52
Id. at 748-56.
53
WATERS, supra note 23, at 3, reports that Thomas Jefferson proposed an initiative process for
Virginia in 1775 but it was not put in the Virginia Constitution.
54
Herbert, supra note 44 (quoting Professor Tribe).
55
Perhaps the best example comes in the area of the Eleventh Amendment, where Justice Scalia,
arguably the Justice on the current Supreme Court most committed to textualism, has rejected the
literal words of the Eleventh Amendment in favor of century-old precedent. See Lackland H.
Bloom, Jr., Interpretive Issues in Semonole and Alden, 55 SMU L. REV. 377, 380 (2002).
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were they writing on a clean slate. Thus, I turn to the relevant precedents and
policy arguments on this question.
C.

The Relevant Precedents under Article II, and under Articles I and V
1. Article II Precedent

As there is no direct Supreme Court precedent on the question of the
constitutionality of initiated Electoral College reform against an Article II
challenge, I turn to the closest cases on point, beginning with other Article II
cases.
Article II achieved something of national prominence during the 2000 election
and the ensuing controversy over allocation of Florida’s electoral votes. This is
not the place for a rehash of all the legal issues arising out of that controversy.56
But the Supreme Court dealt with Article II in both of the cases it heard arising
out of the Florida controversy, and these decisions may shed some light on the
initiated Electoral College reform issue as well.
In the first of these cases, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,57
the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a decision issued by the
Florida Supreme Court concerning Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore’s
request for a recount in four Florida counties.58 The Florida Supreme Court
reversed the Florida Secretary of State’s decisions regarding whether or not to
include in electoral returns the results of some of these recounts and to extend the
time for some of the recounts.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board was per curiam and rather cryptic. The Court noted that it generally
defers to a state court’s interpretation of a state statute. But in the
case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable not only to
elections to state offices, but also to the selection of Presidential
electors, the legislature is not acting solely under the authority
given it by the people of the State, but by virtue of a direct grant of
authority made under Article II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States
Constitution.59

56

For my own brief summary, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 42-46 (2003). For a more extensive
analysis, see ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL
BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY (2001).
57
531 U.S. 70 (2000).
58
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
59
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76.
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The Court then quoted from an 1892 Supreme Court case, McPherson v.
Blacker,60 to the effect that the key words in Article II “operat[e] as a limitation
upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power”61
to set the manner for choosing presidential electors. The Supreme Court then
stated that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision “may be read to indicate that it
construed the Florida Election Code without regard to the extent to which the
Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, ‘circumscribe the
legislative power.’”62 The Court remanded the case “for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion”63 for the lower court to explain “the extent to
which [it] saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature’s
authority under Article II, § 1, cl. 2.”64
Stripped of the obtuse language, the point of the Supreme Court’s first
Florida case appeared to be this: Article II of the Constitution vests “authority”
for setting the manner of choosing presidential electors in the hands of the
Legislature. In McPherson, the Supreme Court wrote that Article II prevents the
state from “circumscrib[ing] the legislative power” to set those rules. This
principle might apply even to limits on legislative power contained in the state’s
own constitution. Because it was unclear whether the Florida Supreme Court
read the Florida constitution’s right to vote as trumping the Florida state
legislature’s rules for choosing presidential electors, remand was in order.65
Eight days after the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board it decided a second case arising from the Florida controversy.
Al Gore by this point had contested the results of the election, and asked for
additional manual recounts of votes in certain Florida counties. A Florida trial
court judge denied the request for recounts, but the Florida Supreme Court
reversed, ordering a statewide recount of all the undervotes cast in the state in the
presidential election, along with other relief.66 The Florida Supreme Court ruling

60

146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892).
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76 (quoting McPherson).
62
Id. at 77. The Court also noted that it was unclear the extent to which the Court considered the
effect of a federal statute, 3 U.S.C. § 5, regarding a “safe harbor” preventing Congressional
challenge to a state’s Electoral College votes submitted within a certain period of time. Id. at 7778. This point is irrelevant to the Article II analysis in the text.
63
Id. at 78.
64
Id. The Court also directed the Florida Supreme Court on remand to explain “the consideration
the Florida Supreme Court accorded to 3 U.S.C. § 5. Id.
65
On remand, the Florida Supreme Court reached the same decision, this time without relying on
the state Constitution. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 772 So.2d 1273 (Fla.
2000).
66
Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243 (2000).
61
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depended upon several controversial interpretations of Florida’s election statutes,
and it drew a blistering dissent from the chief justice of that court.67
As is well known, in Bush v. Gore68 the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote,
reversed the Florida Supreme Court, ending the recount process and leading to the
choice of George W. Bush over Al Gore as president. A per curiam opinion for
five Justices held that the recounts ordered by the Florida Supreme Court failed to
comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause, and that a remand for recounts under acceptable standards was
inappropriate (with the result being that Florida’s votes would be certified for
candidate Bush and he would be declared president).69 Four Justices rejected the
per curiam opinion.70
Three of the five Justices signing on to the majority opinion—Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas—wrote separately as well
to argue that the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion violated Article II. Whereas
the Article II issue in the first Florida case concerned the question whether the
state constitution was improperly trumping the state legislature’s wishes as to the
manner of choosing electors, the question in the second Florida case concerned
whether the Florida Supreme Court itself was improperly trumping the state
legislature’s wishes as to the manner of choosing electors.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that under Article II “the general coherence
of the legislative scheme [for the appointing of Florida’s 25 electors] may not be
altered by judicial interpretation so as to wholly change the statutorily provided
apportionment of responsibility among these various bodies.”71 “What we would
do in the present case is …hold that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Florida election laws impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading
required, in violation of Article II.”72 In other words, in the view of the
concurring Justices, the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida statutes
governing election contests so mangled Florida’s legislatively-created statutes as
to create “new law” for choosing presidential electors in violation of Article II.
The four Bush v. Gore dissenters took great issue with view of Article II
expressed in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence. Justice Stevens wrote that
“nothing in Article II of the Constitution frees the state legislature from the
67

Id. at 1262-70 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
69
Id. at 110-11.
70
Two of the Justices in dissent, Justices Breyer and Souter agreed there were constitutional
problems with the Florida Supreme Court order, but rejected the majority’s decision to end the
recounts. The other two Justices, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, rejected the equal protection
argument in toto.
71
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
72
Id. at 115.
68
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constraints in the State Constitution that created it. Moreover, the Florida
Legislature’s own decision to employ a unitary code for all elections indicted that
it intended the Florida Supreme Court to play the same role in Presidential
elections that it has historically played in resolving electoral disputes.”73 He
added that “[i]t is perfectly clear that the meaning of the words ‘Manner’ and
‘Legislature’ as used in Article II, § 1, parallels the usage in Article I, § 4, rather
than the language in Article V. [Citations.] Article I, § 4, and Article II, § 1, both
call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking capacity whereas Article V simply
calls on the legislative body to deliberate upon a binary decision.”74
What do these two cases tell us about the Supreme Court’s understanding
of Article II in relation to the question of the constitutionality of initiated
Electoral College reform under Article II? Very little. It is possible to read Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board as supporting the “Legislature means
Legislature” theory of Article II. After all the case cited McPherson for language
suggesting that no organ of state power—presumably from a state constitution to
the state judiciary to the people acting through the initiative process—may
“circumscribe the legislative power” to set the manner for choosing presidential
electors. That reading is consistent with a strict textualist reading of the clause.
But a closer look at Palm Beach County Canvassing Board shows that it
did not actually endorse this language from McPherson. The Court first
described McPherson as “not address[ing] the same question petitioner raises
here.”75 It then quoted McPherson without necessarily endorsing it. It concluded
not with any statement that the Legislature’s Article II power is plenary and
exclusive in determining the rules for choosing presidential electors. Instead,
after quoting from McPherson, the Supreme Court in Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board simply remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court for
clarification of the basis for the lower court’s ruling, without committing itself to
73

Id. at 124 (Stevens J., joined by Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter wrote
that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation was not “unreasonable to the point of displacing
the legislative enactment” in violation of Article II. Id. at 131. Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[b]y
holding that Article II requires our revision of a state court’s construction of state laws in order to
protect one organ of the State from another, THE CHIEF JUSTICE contradicts the basic principle
that a State may organize itself as it sees fit.” Id. at 141 (Ginsburg J., joined by Stevens, J., Souter,
J. and Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote that “neither the text of Article II itself nor the
only case the concurrence cites that interprets Article II, McPherson v. Blacker [], leads to the
conclusion that Article II grants unlimited power to the legislature, devoid of any state
constitutional limitations, to select the manner of pointing electors…Nor, as Justice Stevens points
out, have we interpreted the federal constitutional provision most analogous to Art. II, § 1—Art. I,
§ 4—in the strained manner put forth in the concurrence.” Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., joined by
Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., and Souter, J., dissenting).
74
Id.. at 124 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76.
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striking down the lower court’s decision even if it determined that the lower court
ruling was based upon a holding that the Florida state constitution trumped the
Florida legislature’s statutes governing the presidential election process.
This reading of Palm Beach County Canvassing Board is consistent with
the posture and politics of the case. There was undoubtedly pressure both inside
and outside the Supreme Court to issue a unanimous opinion in the Florida cases,
to show that the Supreme Court as an institution stood above politics. To reach
such a unanimous opinion, however, the Court had to craft an opinion that would
satisfy divergent views of the constitutional question. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board is more of a punt than an opinion; by remanding, it bought
time for the issue to resolve itself some other way. It is not strong authority for
the Legislature means Legislature theory of Article II.
Further support for the argument that Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board decided nothing on the Article II question comes from the Court’s decision
issued only eight days later in Bush v. Gore. Though Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board was unanimous, in Bush v. Gore the Court divided bitterly on
the meaning of Article II and the appropriate reading of McPherson. Three
Justices read McPherson and Article II as supporting the “Legislature as
Legislature” theory of Article II, four Justices strongly reject this reading in favor
of the “Legislature as legislative process” reading of Article II, and two Justices,
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, did not express an opinion on the issue at all.76
Thus, a fair reading of both Florida cases is that there is not a majority
opinion on the meaning and proper scope of Article II. Moreover, even if there
were a majority on the questions presented in the Florida cases—whether a state
constitution or the state judiciary may trump a state legislature’s rules for
choosing presidential electors—that decision does not necessarily answer the
question whether the people using the initiative process can trump an earlier
legislatively-enacted set of rules.
Nor does it appear that the 1872 case of McPherson v. Blacker, which
figured so prominently in the two Florida cases, answers the question of the
proper reading of Article II. In McPherson, the Supreme Court rejected a
76

Professor Amar states that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Bush v. Gore concurrence “likely had the
tacit support of Justice’s O’Connor and Kennedy, as well.” Amar, supra note 47. I am not sure
why Professor Amar draws this conclusion. If anything, the opposite appears to be the case.
Many people have speculated that the Rehnquist concurrence was originally to be the majority
opinion of the Court, and that Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, uncomfortable with the Rehnquist
approach, drafted the per curiam opinion. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore: A Special
Report; Election Case a Test and Trauma for Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001 (“although
intended as a majority opinion, the chief justice's opinion failed to get the support of Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor. They drafted their own opinion, concluding that the standardless recount
violated the guarantee of equal protection”).
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complaint that the decision of the Michigan legislature to use electoral districts
for the allocation of presidential electors violated Article II. There seems little
question on the merits that a state legislature has such power under Article II, and
therefore any statements about whether Article II limits state constitutions, courts,
or the people is unnecessary to the decision and therefore obiter dicta. Moreover,
what the McPherson Court did say on that score was contradictory. On the one
hand, the McPherson Court wrote that Article II prevents the state from
“circumscribing legislative power.77 It also stated that Article II leaves the choice
of the manner for choosing presidential electors “exclusively” to the
legislatures.78 On the other hand, McPherson implicitly rejects the “Legislature
means Legislature” theory by stating that “[t]he Legislative power is the supreme
authority except as limited by the constitution of the State.”79 Zipkin, noting the
conflicting dicta, concludes quite correctly that McPherson “is a very weak
foundation for an important decision on constitutional law; the plaintiff’s claim
was patently unsound and anything the Court would have said beyond its
rejection would be extraneous.”80
One other set of Article II cases merits a brief mention before turning to
cases under other provisions of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld congressional power to regulate federal elections, despite the
fact that by its own express terms Article II gives Congress no more than the
power to set the time for the choosing of presidential electors.81 While these
precedents by no means speak directly to the question of the propriety of initiated
77

146 U.S. at 25.
Id. at 27.
79
Id. at 25; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting this language
from McPherson).
80
Saul Zipkin, Note, Judicial Redistricting and the Article I State Legislature, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 350, 362-63 (2003). Both Zipkin, id. at 358-64, and Smith, supra note 43, 765-83, trace the
history of the “Legislature means Legislature” reading of Article II in some state supreme court
cases which did not reach the United States Supreme Court.
81
In Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), the Court held that Congress had the power
under Article II to regulate corrupt practices that could affect presidential elections. In Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court upheld Congress’s power to regulate campaign financing in
both congressional and presidential elections. And in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970),
the Court upheld Congress’s power to change the voting age for president to 18. Justice Black cast
the decisive vote on the issue, concluding that “[i]t cannot be seriously contended that Congress
has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over congressional elections.”
Id. at 124 (opn. of Black, J.). I recently cited these cases in testimony before the Senate Rules and
Administration Committee on the likely constitutionality of a proposed federal statute that would
set the dates for a regional presidential primary system. See United States Senate Committee on
Rules and Administration Hearing on S.1905, “Regional Presidential and Primary Caucus Act of
2007,” September 19, 2007, Statement of Richard L. Hasen, available at:
http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2007/HasenTestimony091907.pdf.
78
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Electoral College reform, they do represent a rejection of a narrow textualist
approach to the meaning of Article II. Even Justice Scalia, a committed
textualist, has rejected a narrow textualist reading of Article II in the context of
the question of Congressional power to regulate presidential elections, at least to
some extent.82
2.

The Article I, Section 4, and Article V Cases

Faced with the lack of any definitive precedent in the Article II area, we
might look fruitfully to interpretation of two other Constitutional provisions that
require understanding the meaning of the term “Legislature.” Article I, section 4
of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing Senators.”83 Article V
requires ratification of constitutional amendment “by Legislatures of three fourths
of the several States.”84 Unfortunately from the point of view of clarity, the term
“Legislature” has been interpreted in contradictory ways in these two
constitutional provisions.
The two leading cases in the Article I, section 4 context support the
“Legislature as legislative process” reading of the Constitution. In Ohio ex rel.
Davis v. Hildebrant,85 the Ohio Constitution had been amended to provide that
legislative power was vested not only in the state legislature, but also “in the
people, in whom a right was reserved by way of referendum to approve or
disapprove by popular vote any law enacted by the general assembly.”86 The Ohio
general assembly passed a redistricting act for congressional elections, and
enough electors petitioned for the measure to be subject to voter approval through
a referendum. Voters rejected the redistricting act in a referendum. The Supreme
Court considered whether, under Article I, section 4, the results of the referendum
affected the validity of the redistricting measure passed by the Ohio general
assembly. Rejecting the “Legislature as Legislature” theory in this context, the
Supreme Court held that “the referendum constituted a part of the state
Constitution and laws; and was contained within the legislative power; and
therefore the claim that the law which was disapproved and was no law under the
Constitution and laws of the state was yet valid and operative is conclusively
82

Antonin Scalia, The Legal Framework for Reform, 4 COMMONSENSE 40, 47 (1981).
U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
84
Id., Art. V (emphasis added).
85
241 U.S. 565 (1916).
86
Id. at 566.
83
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established to be wanting in merit.”87 The Court also suggested that any further
challenge to the use of the referendum power (such as by claiming it violated the
constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government) was a nonjusticable
political question best addressed by Congress.88
Similarly, in Smiley v. Holm,89 the two houses of the Minnesota state
legislature passed a bill dividing the state into nine new congressional districts
following a decennial census. The governor returned the bill without his
approval. The Minnesota legislature took the position that under Article I, section
4, the governor’s approval was not necessary for the redistricting measure to go
into effect. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that in the absence of a contrary
intent, “the exercise of the authority [to regulate congressional elections] must be
in accordance with the method which the state has prescribed for legislative
enactments.”90 Because normal laws in Minnesota were subject to gubernatorial
veto, the redistricting measure returned by the governor could not be effective.91
These cases remain good law today under Article I, section 4, and lend
some support to the initiated Electoral College reform power. To the extent there
is reason to read the term “Legislature” in Article I, section 4 parallel to its use in
Article II, Smiley and Hildebrant stand for the proposition that “Legislature” can
mean “legislative power” and not just the actual state legislature. It should be
noted, however, that in both Smiley and Hildebrant the state legislature still
retained some role in the choice of congressional districting. Laws passed by the
initiative process would completely exclude the legislature from that process (or
the analogous process of selecting the manner of choosing presidential electors
under Article II). So it would be possible to (1) accept the analogy between
Article II and Article I, section 4 and (2) accept Smiley and Hildebrant as good
law, (3) but still hold that initiated Electoral College reform violates Article II
because it leaves no role for the state legislature.92

87

Id. at 568.
Id. at 569.
89
285 U.S. 355 (1932).
90
Id. at 368.
91
Id. at 372-73.
92
Indeed, Justice Stevens, speaking only for himself, has suggested that under Article I, section 4,
initiated changes to the manner of conducting Congressional elections that are not changeable by
the state legislature may be unconstitutional. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S.
567, 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The text of [Article I, section 4] suggests that such an
initiative system, in which popular choices regarding the manner of state elections are
unreviewable by independent legislative action, may not be a valid method of exercising the
power that the Clause vests in state ‘Legislature[s].’”); see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 517,
526 n.20 (2001) (refusing to reach question whether initiative requiring disclosure of
congressional candidate’s views on term limits violated Article I, section 4).
88
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One recent Article I, section IV case deserves mention. In Colorado
General Assembly v. Salazar,93 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case
involving a Colorado Supreme Court decision on Congressional redistricting.
The Colorado Supreme Court had held that under the Colorado constitution, there
could be only one redistricting conducted per decade. A court had ordered
redistricting earlier in the decade when the Colorado legislature failed to pass a
redistricting plan, and in Salazar the Colorado Supreme Court held that the
earlier, judicially-mandated districting prohibited the state legislature from
redistricting again until the next decade. The Colorado General Assembly and
Secretary of State argued that the Colorado Supreme Court’s construction of the
Colorado Constitution violated Article I, section 4—paralleling the argument
about the Florida Supreme Court usurping the Florida legislature’s Article II
power in Bush v. Gore. The same three Justices advancing the Article II theory in
a concurrence in Bush v. Gore—Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and
Thomas—dissented from the denial of certiorari in Salazar on similar grounds.
“[T]o be consistent with Article I, § 4, there must be some limit on the State’s
ability to define lawmaking by excluding the legislature itself in favor of the
courts.”94 Though the statement seems to support the “Legislature means
Legislature theory,” the dissenters distinguished Smiley and Hildebrant in a way
that could actually support the constitutionality of initiated Electoral College
reform: “Conspicuously absent from the Colorado lawmaking regime, under the
Supreme Court of Colorado’s construction of the Colorado Constitution to
include state-court orders as part of the lawmaking, is participation in the process
by a body representing the people, or the people themselves in a referendum.”95
The denial of a writ of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits, so we should be
careful not to read too much into the fact that only three Justices advanced some
version of the “Legislature means Legislature” theory in the Article I, section 4
context.
Though the leading Article I, section 4 cases endorse the “Legislature as
legislative process” theory, on the other side of this divide are Article V cases. In
Hawke v. Smith,96 the Supreme Court considered the propriety of an Ohio
constitutional reserving the right of the people to adopt or reject at the polls a
decision by the state legislature to ratify an amendment to the United States
Constitution. Article V of the U.S. Constitution requires ratification by “the
Legislatures of three-fourths of the several states.”97 And in Hawke the Supreme
93

541 U.S. 1093 (2004),
Id. at 1095 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
95
Id.
96
253 U.S. 221 (1920).
97
U.S. CONST. Art. V.
94
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Court held that the term “Legislature” in this context meant the actual state
legislature, and not the “Legislature as legislative power.”
The Court held the error with the “Legislature as legislative power” theory
of Article V is that it rested on the “fallacious” idea that ratification of a
constitutional amendment was an act of legislation. Instead, ratification “is but
the expression of the assent of the state to the proposed amendment.”98 The Court
further endorsed an administrative rationale for the rule that only the state
legislature plays a role in ratification of amendments to the U.S. Constitution:
“Any other view might lead to endless confusion in the manner of ratification of
federal amendments.”99
Finally, the Hawke Court distinguished its decision in Hildebrant on two
grounds. First, Congress itself had recognized the power of states to approve
referenda concerning redistricting matters, and Article I, section 4 (unlike Article
II) gives Congress the power to choose rules for congressional elections that
trump state rules.100 Second, the Hawke Court contrasted the nature of the action
of a state legislature in setting rules for Congressional elections under its Article
I, section 4 power compared to its ratification of constitutional amendments under
its Article V power: “Such legislative action [in the Article I, section 4 context] is
entirely different from the requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of
assent or dissent to a proposed amendment to the Constitution. In such
expression no legislative action is authorized or required.”101 As Zipkin puts it, in
the Article V context, “the state has no power to define its legislature as it chooses
when the legislature is co-opted to perform a federal task.”102
Taken together, these cases provide a reasonable amount of support for the
“Legislature as legislative power” theory of Article II, which would allow for
initiated Electoral College reform. The Court in its Article I, section 4 cases has
endorsed this theory, and it appears that Article II legislating the rules for
choosing presidential electors is more like Article I, section IV legislating the
rules for congressional elections than like Article V ratification of constitutional
amendments. In both the Article I, section IV and Article II contexts, the
Constitution contemplates “legislative action,”103 which may extend beyond the
98

Hawke, 253 U.S. at 229.
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Zipkin, supra note 80, at 373; see also Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922): “The
function of the state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution,
like the function of Congress in proposing the amendment, is a federal function derived from the
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103
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pure actions of the legislature to other organs of state power. In the Article V
context, in contrast, there is simply the question of legislative “assent or
dissent.”104 As Justice Stevens put it in his dissent in Bush v. Gore, “Article I, §
4, and Article II, § 1, both call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking capacity
whereas Article V simply calls on the legislative body to deliberate upon a binary
decision.”105 On the other hand, Article II gives more power to the state
legislature than Article I, section 4. The former gives the state Legislature the
power to choose electors directly; the latter gives the state Legislature only the
manner for running congressional elections (subject, of course, to Congressional
override, absent in Article II).
The case for the Article I, section 4 analogy is not ironclad, especially
given the force of the contrary textualist argument and the strong contrary views
in the two recent Florida decisions, which could weigh heavily on the Supreme
Court if the issue comes before it. Whether the similarities between the two
sections of the Constitution would be enough for the Supreme Court to uphold
initiated Electoral College reform as consistent with Article II—especially given
the fact that such reform cuts the state legislature completely out of the process of
setting the manner for choosing presidential electors, remains to be seen.106
Given this uncertainty, I turn finally to policy-based arguments supporting the
two alternative theories of Article II.
D.
A Purposivist/Policymaking Approach to Article II’s Use of the Term
“Legislature”
Faced with a textualist argument pointing in one direction on the meaning
of Article II and a caselaw analysis pointing, at least moderately, in the other
direction, it is fruitful to turn to policy arguments that might break the tie over
whether initiated Electoral College reform violates Article II. Here, I consider
three potential clusters of theories about the purpose of Article II—
democratization/filtration, anti-manipulation, and national interest/federalism—
and consider whether initiated Electoral College reform is consistent with, or in
104

Id.
Bush v. Gore, 531 at 124 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Wagner, supra note 24, at 599
(“given the strong viewpoints of the four dissenters in Bush v. Gore, as well as the appeal of a
structural argument highlighting the similarities between Article I, Section 4 and Article II,
Section 1, the better answer is to regard ballot initiatives as a constitutional exercise of a state’s
legislative power under Article II, Section 1.”).
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The issue could become even more complicated if a state Legislature acted after initiated
Electoral College reform passes in a state to reverse the initiated reform. Even if state law would
ordinarily prevent the state legislature from overruling an initiative unless the initiative so
provides (see, e.g. CAL. CONST. Art. II, § 10), perhaps Article II of the U.S. Constitution would
give the state Legislature the power to do so.
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opposition to those purposes. Unfortunately, these theories too point in
conflicting directions.
Democratization/Filtration. Judge McConnell, writing in the context of
Bush v. Gore, gives “two apparent functional justifications”107 for the provision.
His first is a theory of democratization:
[Article II] ensures that the manner of selecting electors will be
chosen by the most democratic branch of the state government.
The election of presidential electors need not be directly
democratic; the legislature could select the electors itself, or even
delegate authority to a more limited body…But by vesting the
authority to choose the mode of selection in the most democratic
branch, the framers gave that decision a democratic bias.108
Judge McConnell offered this theory in favor of the concurring opinion’s
approach in Bush v. Gore finding that the state supreme court had usurped the
power of the state legislature to choose presidential electors: certainly legislatures
are more “democratic” than the courts and perhaps more democratic than the
executive branch. But arguably the initiative process is even more “democratic”
than the state legislature, in that the people themselves, rather than their
representatives, get to choose the rules. Indeed, the initiative process is
particularly valuable when it can be used for election law reform that might not
otherwise take place because of the self-interest of legislators.109 If the purpose of
Article II is democratization, then initiated Electoral College reform should be
constitutional, even encouraged.
However, to the extent one cares about the framers’ intent, there is reason
to doubt the premise of the argument that Article II’s purpose is democratization.
What we know from Article II’s scant legislative history is that at least some of
the Constitution’s drafters favored giving control over the rules of choosing
presidential electors in the hands of state Legislatures rather than, as in the case of
choosing members of Congress, directly in the hands of the people.110
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McConnell, supra note 50, at 103.
Id. at 103-04.
109
Even some opponents of the initiative process have recognized the point. See Richard L.
Hasen, Comments on Baker, Clark, and Direct Democracy, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 563, 564
(2004).
110
See Smith, supra note 43, at 752-53 (explaining that Elbridge Gerry favored legislative
appointment to protect state interests and to “filter the popular will through an intermediate
body.”).
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Though this history is far from clear, and some of the ratifiers likely
believed Article II gave the power to choose electors to the people,111 in the end
the framers of Article II made a less democratic choice than direct election of the
president by the people.
Indeed, it is just as plausible to reject the
democratization theory in favor of a filtration one: the framers put the power in
the hands of legislatures to lessen the amount of the direct influence of the people:
legislatures act as agents for filtering popular will, and provide various means by
which those with intense feelings can block controversial legislation. Allowing
Electoral College reform through the initiative process eliminates the legislative
filtration function. Thus, if we read Article II’s true purpose as filtration rather
than democratization, initiated Electoral College reform should be rejected.
Anti-manipulation. Judge McConnell offers a second rationale for Article
II:
[L]egislatures, in contrast to courts and executive officials, must
enact their rules in advance of any particular controversy. A
legislative code is enacted behind a veil of ignorance; no one
knows (for sure) which rules will benefit which candidates….To
be sure, this veil of ignorance is only partially opaque: it is
sometimes possible to make an educated guess about the probable
partisan consequences of particular electoral rules. For example,
favorable rules for recognizing absentee ballots from abroad could
be expected to benefit Republicans, and easy registration of voters
could be expected to benefit Democrats. Partisan calculation
therefore can play a role. By requiring the manner of selection of
electors to be specified in advance by the legislature, however, the
Constitution limits the ability of political actors to rig the rules in
favor of their candidate.112
The anti-manipulation rationale, as offered by Judge McConnell,
moderately supports the constitutionality of initiated Electoral College reform.
Initiatives, like statutes passed by legislatures, must be written in advance.
Indeed, given the lead time necessary to write an initiative, obtain a title and
summary from a government agency, collect signatures, and have those signatures
verified, the lead time on initiatives is much longer than legislation. Presumably
there are some rules for choosing presidential electors that a legislature can
111

Smith ultimately concludes that even at the time of ratification of the Constitution, “Article II,
Section 1 meant different things to different people; some would have state legislatures choose
electors, while others would have the people do it.” Id. at 757.
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McConnell, supra note 50, at 104.
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choose up to the last minute (or even beyond, as we shall see); that is not true
with an initiative. If anything, initiatives should be preferred to legislative
enactments on anti-manipulation grounds.
There are two potential problems with the anti-manipulation rationale,
however. First, to the extent one cares about original intent, there is nothing I am
aware of that indicates anti-manipulation as a basis for the framers’ decision in
Article II’s decision to vest the power for choosing electors in the hands of the
state Legislature. Indeed Judge McConnell appears to have generated the
rationale not from history but upon considering the facts of the Florida
controversy: he was reacting to what he saw as post-election judicial rule changes
for choosing presidential electors.
Second, and more importantly, though there is much to be said for setting
the rules of the game in advance to prevent partisan manipulation of the
process,113 Article II is not a very good tool for preventing such manipulation.
Indeed, the very essence of the political case against the current California
initiative is that it is just such a partisan manipulation: it is being proposed by
Republicans to help the Republican candidate win the presidency by capturing a
portion of the very large set of California electoral votes. Legislatures can play
this game too: it is worth recalling that during the Florida controversy, the Florida
legislature, dominated by Republicans, stood ready post-election to choose an
alternative Republican slate of electors should the Florida courts have declared
Gore the winner of the state’s electoral votes.114 Thus, it is difficult to read an
anti-manipulation intent into Article II given how little Article II (under either
theory) does to prevent such manipulation.
National Interest/Federalism. There is no question that there is a unique
federal interest at stake in the selection of the President.115 Indeed, this policy
preference underlies Judge Posner’s defense of the result in Bush v. Gore as a
means of avoiding a potential “constitutional crisis” which would have resulted
had Congress been forced to choose between conflicting slates of Florida
presidential electors.116 Moreover, it provides a strong reason why the Florida
113

See infra Part III.B.
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Order without Law, in THE VOTE, supra note 49, at 204, 217 (“Almost
certainly [if the counting went beyond December 12, 2000], the Republican-dominated Florida
legislature would have promptly sent a slate of electors, thus producing two (identical) slates for
Bush.”).
115
Cf. Zipkin, supra note 80, at 375 (suggesting in context of Articles I and II there is not a
“significant federal interest” in assuring that the state legislature plays a substantive federal role).
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RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE COURTS (2001). For my critique of this analysis, see Richard L. Hasen, A “Tincture of
Justice:” Judge Posner’s Failed Rehabilitation of Bush v. Gore (Book Review), 80 TEXAS L.
REV. 137 (2001).
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courts in 2000 should not have ordered a “revote” in Palm Beach County despite
very strong evidence that the poorly designed “butterfly ballot” caused many
voters to mistakenly cast a vote for a different presidential candidate than the one
they preferred.117
If it could be shown that the use of the initiative process makes it more
likely that the outcome of presidential elections would be in dispute compared to
legislatively-set rules for choosing presidential electors, then there might be a
compelling reason based on the national interest to read “Legislature” more
narrowly. But it is hard to see the case ex ante that initiated Electoral College
reform is more likely than legislatively-enacted reform to create such uncertainty,
except insofar as the Article II cloud now hangs over the controversy before the
Supreme Court finally resolves it: once that issue is resolved, assuming the Court
approves initiated Electoral College reform initiated rule changes seem no more
problematic to the national interest than legislative ones.
To promote the interest of national uniformity of the rules for choosing
presidential electors, the framers could have adopted a uniform rule for how states
choose presidential electors; the Constitution does just that in providing that
members of the House of Representatives must be chosen in popular elections.
However, the Constitution’s choice to leave it to the states without even the
possibility of congressional override of state rules—as in Article I, section 4—
shows a commitment not to national uniformity but to federalism and diversity.
Once we accept the principle of state variation, it makes sense to allow those
states that have adopted the initiative process as a means of making all kinds of
important public policy decisions to be able to use it for Electoral College rule
choice as well. Thus, federalism supports the idea of initiated Electoral College
reform.118
***
I am afraid that this policy analysis too leaves us in something of a
muddle. There are reasonable policy arguments to be made on both sides of this
question, and none of these arguments appears to be a strong trump of the others.
There are sound arguments to be made on both sides, and a Supreme Court
decision either way is both plausible and defensible.
117

On the evidence of the effect of the butterfly ballot, see Jonathan N. Wand et al., The Butterfly
Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
793 (2001). On the legal question of the propriety of a revote in the Palm Beach County case, see
Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to
Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 991-93 (2005); Steven J. Mulroy, Right
Without a Remedy? The “Butterfly Ballot” Case and Court-Ordered Federal Election “Revotes,”
10 GEO MASON L. REV. 215 (2001).
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Cf. Wilson, supra note 43, at 1388-98 (apply federalist approach to question of
constitutionality of state court review of legislatively-enacted congressional redistricting plans).
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III.
AVOIDING POST-PRESIDENTIAL LITIGATION OVER ARTICLE II
CHALLENGES TO INITIATED ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM
A.

The Benefits of Pre-election Review of Article II Challenges

Part II demonstrates that the constitutional question surrounding initiated
Electoral College reform is difficult indeed. But sooner or later courts are going to
have to resolve it. In this part, I argue that the question should be resolved sooner
rather than later.
I have elsewhere made the general case that courts should resolve election
law disputes as early as possible and use the doctrine of “laches” to bar suits filed
after an election that could have been filed earlier.119 Pre-election review
sometimes provides the only way to give plaintiffs effective relief;120 in contrast,
post-election litigation, when the winner and loser of the election will be
determined by a court decision, injects courts into the political thicket, threatening
the legitimacy of both the courts and the electoral process.121 Generally speaking,
a rule encouraging pre-election review and discouraging post-election review
serves the public interest best.
Nonetheless, courts sometimes have been reluctant to engage in preelection review,122 perhaps hoping that some issues will resolve themselves
before the election. The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Purcell v. Gonzalez123
may have made things worse in this regard, by suggesting that courts should
avoid preelection review where doing so can engender voter confusion about the
rules applicable to an upcoming election.124
Regardless of the general merits of delaying a decision in election law
cases, courts should not delay decisions on the constitutionality of initiatives
which would change the means for allocating Electoral College votes. As the
2000 Florida controversy showed, every court decision made when the presidency
of the United States may be on the line will be scrutinized, and every judicial
decision inconsistent with an observer’s political leanings may be characterized,
rightly or wrongly, as a political decision made by a biased judge. This danger is
119
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especially strong when it comes to an issue such as the Article II issue, for which
there is no easy answer to the question of constitutionality.
For this reason, it is good news that if the California Electoral College
measure qualifies for the November 2008 ballot, the California Supreme Court
could rely upon precedent to entertain a pre-election challenge to the measure’s
constitutionality. As a general rule, that court will not entertain a pre-election
challenge to an initiative raising the claim that the “substantive provisions of the
measure are unconstitutional.”125 However, when the challenge to the measure
“rests instead on the contention that the measure is not one that properly may be
enacted by initiative,”126 pre-election review “may be appropriate.”127 Thus, in
American Federation of Labor v. Eu,128 the California Supreme Court engaged in
pre-election review to strike from the ballot as a violation of Article V of the U.S.
Constitution an initiative that would have directed the California legislature to
ratify a proposed balanced budget amendment to the Constitution.129
Though the California court “may” find it appropriate to engage in preelection review, there is no guarantee it would do so.130 And other states will not
engage in substantive pre-election review under any circumstances.131 Given the
high costs of uncertainty in this area, one would hope that state courts would
exercise their discretion to find a way to engage in pre-election review of initiated
Electoral College reform before the fate of the presidency would be at stake in the
litigation. The costs of waiting to decide such a case until after such a measure
passes greatly outweigh the benefits of doing so.
B.
The Benefits of a Constitutional Amendment to Delay Implementation of
Electoral College Reform Measures

125

Independent Energy Producers v. McPherson, 38 Cal.4th 1020, 1029 (Cal. 2006).
Id.
127
Id.
128
36 Cal.3d 687, 695-97 (1984).
129
The measure also withheld legislative pay in the event the legislature failed to do so, and
directed the secretary of state to send a notice of ratification of the amendment to Congress if the
state legislature failed to ratify the amendment within 40 days of its passage. See id. at 693-94.
130
Once the California Supreme Court makes a decision on whether or not the measure violates
Article II, the U.S. Supreme Court would appear to have jurisdiction over the case given the
federal question presented. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Standing also would appear not to
be a problem. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 490 U.S. 605, 617-24 (1989).
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See Wyoming National Abortion Rights League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 282, 286 (Wyo. 1994)
(stating that a “majority of courts” in “sister jurisdictions” “have ruled that a controversy over the
constitutionality of an initiative is justiciable only after it has been enacted. These courts clearly
have held that any challenge to the constitutionality of an initiative does not present a justiciable
controversy under any circumstances.”).
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Given uncertainty as to both the Article II question itself and the
willingness and ability of the courts to resolve such questions before a
presidential election, it is worth considering the merits of an amendment to the
U.S. Constitution that would bar changes in a state’s rules for the manner of
choosing presidential electors from going into effect for at least two years after
passage of the change.
Unlike other Electoral College reform proposals which have clear winners
and losers, this amendment would be politically neutral, aimed at preventing last
minute uncertainty and partisan manipulation of the rules for choosing each
state’s presidential electors. Ex ante, all relevant political actors should favor
reducing uncertainty, and all but the most venal will favor eliminating partisan
manipulation (and even the venal might favor this proposal if they expect they
could be on the wrong end of such manipulation at some point in the future).
On the merits, the only downside I see to such a constitutional amendment
is that it might create a problem in the event of some kind of major catastrophe,
either within a state or nationally. That is, there may be pressing emergency
reasons for allowing immediate changes to the means for choosing presidential
electors. For this reason, the amendment should be written to provide for some
kind of escape clause from the measure in the event of such a catastrophe.
Consider the following language for a proposed Amendment: “No
changes in any state’s manner for choosing presidential electors shall be effective
until two years after such change is put in effect; except that such changes shall
be effective immediately upon a declaration by a majority of Congress, the state’s
governor, or a 2/3 majority of the state legislature that a state or national
catastrophe requires the change to take effect immediately.”
As with any constitutional amendment, such a measure is unlikely to pass.
It is hard to see what political incentive enough members of Congress and state
legislatures would have for carrying this good government provision through the
many hurdles of the amendment process.132 Still, such a measure ought to pass,
even if more significant changes to our system for choosing the president remain
in place.

132

Consider, along similar lines, Congress’s inaction over legislation to deal with national
catastrophes affecting the composition of Congress despite the major activity of the Continuity of
Government Commission, http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/.
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CONCLUSION
Whether or not the California Electoral College measure qualifies for the
ballot and is voted upon, courts eventually will have to confront the question
whether initiated Electoral College reform violates Article II of the U.S.
Constitution. With the National Popular Vote movement in full swing, and other
proposals for Electoral College reform floating around, it is only a matter of time
before some initiative changing the system qualifies for a state ballot and stands a
chance of passing.
Though the constitutional question is straightforward, the answer is not: a
strict textual view suggests that initiated reform is unconstitutional; caselaw and
policy arguments show the question is more uncertain. Reasonable judges could
reach opposite conclusions on the question. Lacking any clear constitutional
answers, there is a danger that judges deciding the question will appear to the
public to be swayed—consciously or subconsciously—by political considerations.
If the timing goes just wrong, we could have another Bush v. Gore on our hands,
with the Supreme Court deciding yet another presidential election under contested
standards.
Because of these uncertainties, we should consider steps to avoid another
presidential election decided by the courts on these grounds. I have proposed two
steps: courts should be willing to engage in pre-election review of Electoral
College changes by initiative, even if the courts do not otherwise engage in preelection review of the constitutionality of initiatives. Second, we should amend
the Constitution to put a delay on Electoral College reforms, to give time for
courts to work out the legal issues surrounding such reforms out of the context of
an immediate presidential election. Such a delay also minimizes the chances that
partisans (either in the legislature or through the initiative process) could attempt
to manipulate Electoral College rules for short-term political gain.
For good or for bad, we appear to be stuck with both the Electoral College
for the foreseeable future and fairly widespread opposition to its use. With that
combination, it is only prudent to plan how avoid a constitutional crisis over
attempts to reform the system.
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